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KELSEN'S PURE THEORY
OF LAW
HENRY COHEN*
Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) was a leading German-American legal posi-
tivist. His major works on legal positivism were the General Theory of
Law and State and the Pure Theory of Law.' This article will summarize
Kelsen'sopure theory of law, comment on his view of customary court-
made law, and briefly critique his concept of the basic norm.
THE PURE THEORY OF LAW
Positivism
Kelsen was a legal positivist. The "positivity" of law, in his words,
lies in the fact that it is created and annulled by acts of human beings, thus
being independent of morality and similar norm systems. This constitutes
the difference between positive law and natural law, which, like morality, is
deduced from a presumably self-evident basic norm which is considered to
be the expression of the "will of nature" or of "pure reason."'
Kelsen labelled his theory of positive law "the pure theory of law." He
explained the nature of its purity:
[I]t seeks to preclude from the cognition of positive law all elements foreign
thereto. The limits of this subject and its cognition must be clearly fixed in
two directions: the specific science of law, the discipline usually called juris-
prudence, must be distinguished from the philosophy of justice, on the one
* Legislative Attorney for the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service
of the Library of Congress. B.A., Queens College, 1970; J.D., St. John's University School of
Law, 1975. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Congres-
sional Research Service or the Library of Congress.
The first edition of PURE THEORY OF LAW [hereinafter cited as PURE THEORY] was pub-
lished in 1934, and the second in 1960 (trans. 1967). GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
[hereinafter cited as GENERAL THEORY], published in 1945, was intended as a reformulation
of the first edition of PURE THEORY, as well as other works. GENERAL THEORY at xiii. The
second edition of PURE THEORY was a revision and enlargement of the first. Kelsen, Profes-
sor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 1130 (1965).
1 GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 114.
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hand, and from sociology, or cognition of social reality, on the other.3
The pure theory of law should be distinguished from the philosophy of
justice. While the pure theory of law is a science,4 justice is an "irrational
ideal" 5 and "a judgment of value, determined by emotional factors and
therefore subjective in character.""
The pure theory of law must also be distinguished from sociological
jurisprudence. The pure theory of law studies norms-"propositions that
state how men should behave" 7-whereas sociological jurisprudence stud-
ies what "is"-how people actually behave. Thus, Kelsen agreed with
neither the natural law theorists, who viewed law and morality as sharing
the same basis,8 nor the legal realists, who believed that law consists
solely of "the actual decisions of courts that litigants must live with."
Law as a Coercive Order
Kelsen viewed law as a coercive order of human behavior. Laws
"command a certain human behavior by attaching a coercive act to the
opposite behavior."10 He disagreed, however, with the belief of John Aus-
tin, who posited laws to be "a species of commands,"" since a command
"is essentially a willing and its expression," and because it is doubtful
whether some laws embody the true will of anyone."2 Many legislators
enact laws without understanding them, let alone willing them. Kelsen
preferred to describe laws as norms or rules "stating that an individual
ought to behave in a certain way, but not asserting that such behavior is
the actual will of anyone.""
Kelsen also disagreed with Austin's position that laws are enforced
by a specific authority." Understanding this to mean that the threat of
' Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44
(1941), reprinted in H. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? (1957).
The pure theory of law is a normative science, rather than a natural science, in that it
studies the significance of facts, not simply facts. See Snyder, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of
Law, 12 How. L.J. 110, 115-16 (1966).
Kelsen, supra note 3, at 48.
6 Id. at 45.
Id. at 52.
Kelsen observed that the doctrine of natural law "either justifies positive law by proclaim-
ing its agreement with the natural, reasonable, or divine order, an agreement asserted but
not proved, or it puts in question the validity of positive law by claiming that it is in contra-
diction of one of the presupposed absolutes." Id. at 48.
9 Taylor, Law and Morality, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 611, 634 (1968).
'0 PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 33.
J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 88 (5th ed. 1885).
" Kelsen, supra note 3, at 55.
IS Id. at 56.
See J. AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 89.
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sanctions commands obedience, Kelsen noted that fear of sanctions is
often not the primary motive for obedience to law. 15 In any event, Kelsen
considered the reason why law is obeyed to be "a problem of sociological,
not analytical or normative jurisprudence. The latter can only affirm that
the law sets up coercive measures as sanctions that are to be directed
under definite conditions against definite individuals." '
Kelsen thus eliminated what he perceived as the often fictional psy-
chological content from the definition of law. Law consists not of the will
of one person or group enforced upon others through fear of sanctions,
but merely norms which provide that persons ought to act in specified
ways. If they do not, others should employ sanctions against them. Fur-
thermore, Kelsen observed, the norms providing that persons ought to act
in specified ways are unnecessary.17 For example, the norm "you shall not
murder" is superfluous if there is another norm providing "he who
murders ought to be punished." Moreover, without the norm "he who
murders ought to be punished," the norm "you shall not murder" would
not be law.
The Basis of Law
How is a coercive order which is a "law" distinguished from an illegal
threat? To Kelsen, the difference was that "[t]he meaning of a threat is
that an evil will be inflicted under certain conditions; the meaning of a
legal order is that certain evils ought to be inflicted under certain condi-
tions ...."18 The sanction in the case of the threat is invalid; in the case
of the law, it is valid-but why? Kelsen explained that a legal norm is
valid if it has been created in accordance with another, higher norm:
If one asks the reason for the validity of a judicial decision, the answer runs:
the decision containing the individual norm, by which, for example, A is
obligated to pay B $1000, is valid because the decision came into being by
the application of general norms of statutory or customary law that em-
power the court to decide a concrete case in a certain manner. The general
norms so applied are valid because they were created in accordance with the
Kelsen, supra note 3, at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
7 See Kelsen, supra note 3, at 57-59. H.L.A. Hart has pointed out some shortcomings of
viewing laws as merely directions to officials to employ sanctions under specified conditions.
As an example Hart states:
A punishment for crime, such as a fine, is not the same as a tax on a course of con-
duct, though both involve directions to officials to inflict the same money loss. What
differentiates these ideas is that the first involves, as the second does not, an offense
of breach of duty in the form of a violation of a rule set up to guide the conduct of
ordinary citizens.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39 (1961).
's PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 44.
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constitution. What is the reason for the validity of the constitution? The
norm from which the constitution derives its validity is the basic norm of
the legal order. This basic norm is responsible for the unity of the legal
order.'
What, then, is this basic norm? It is a norm that is presupposed. Its
content, in any legal system, is essentially that the prescriptions of the
constitution must be obeyed."0 The basic norm "is not. . . valid because
it is created in a certain way by a legal act, but it is valid because it is
presupposed to be valid; and it is presupposed to be valid because with-
out this presupposition no human act could be interpreted as a legal, es-
pecially as a norm-creating, act."' The alternative to attributing the va-
lidity of the constitution, and hence the legal system, to be a presupposed
basic norm is to attribute it to God or nature.2 2 Kelsen regarded this as
irrational.
Kelsen's formulation of the basic norm reveals that when he said that
a law ought to be obeyed, or that a law was valid, his statement was
somewhat relative.2" A law ought to be obeyed from the standpoint of the
legal system, not necessarily from the standpoint of a moral or religious
system. To say that a law is valid is merely to say that it is a law. Legal
positivism, Kelsen wrote, does not purport "to produce a material and
absolute justification of the legal order. ' 24
Validity and Efficacy
To Kelsen, a norm was valid if it ought to be obeyed, and it ought to
be obeyed if it was created as prescribed by a valid higher norm, which
ultimately was created as prescribed by the presupposed basic norm. A
norm was efficacious, however, if in practice it generally was obeyed: "Va-
lidity and efficacy are two completely distinct qualities; and yet there is a
certain connection between the two." 5 One connection is that while a
single legal norm may be valid but not efficacious, a norm which remains
inefficacious becomes deprived of any validity by "desuetudo."
"Desuetudo" is the negative legal effect of custom. "A norm may be an-
nulled by custom, viz., by a custom contrary to the norm, as well as it
may be created by custom. '2' Kelsen believed that any legal norm, in-
' Kelsen, supra note 3, at 63.
00 PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 201.
" GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 116.
" PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 200.
" See GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 394.
Id. at 396.
" Kelsen, supra note 3, at 50.
, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 119. It is suggested that it would be more consistent
with Kelsen's view of law as a coercive order to state that a norm is not deprived of its
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cluding a statutory norm, may lose its validity by desuetudo.27 This vul-
nerability would even exist in statutory norm which provides that stat-
utes may not lose their validity by desuetudo.
A second correlation between validity and efficacy is that, although a
single norm may be valid but not efficacious, if the legal order itself loses
its efficacy, none of its norms remains valid, since its basic norm would no
longer be presupposed. This happens when there is a revolution, which
"occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced
by a new order in an illegitimate way, that is in a way not prescribed by
the first order itself."2 8 Usually, after a revolution, most of the legal or-
der's general norms remain in place. They are no longer valid, however,
for the same reason. A new basic norm is presupposed which validates the
norms it adopts from the old order.
CUSTOMARY LAW AND COURT-MADE LAW
Customary Law
Kelsen distinguished "between statutory law and customary law as
the two fundamental types of law." 9 He defined statutory law broadly, to
include law created "by legislative, judicial, or administrative acts or by
legal transactions, especially by contracts and (international) treaties.""0
Statutory law, then, was a law "created by an act that deliberately aims
at creating law .... ,,s In contrast, customary law was defined as law
that originated in customary conduct. Individuals do not intentionally
seek to create customary law, but necessarily consider their behavior to
be conforming to a binding norm.3 2 The acting individuals who create a
customary law must be an overwhelming majority of those obligated or
entitled by it.3 3 Once a custom becomes law, all individuals are bound by
it, just as they are by the statutory law which they did not create di-
rectly.3 The authority for courts to apply customary law, Kelsen argued,
validity by desuetudo; it is deprived of its validity when a court for the first time refuses, on
the ground of desuetudo, to apply a sanction to a violation of the norm. At least one scholar
noted Kelsen's apparent inconsistency: "As the norm [to be valid] need not be efficacious it
follows that the sanction need only be a formal one. . . . The important point to note is
that if the sanction need only be formal then it cannot be an essential element in law." A.L.
GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 16-17 (1953).
" See GENERAL-THEORY, supra note 1, at 119.
" Id. at 117.
" Id. at 114-15.
'o Id. at 115.
" Id. at 114.
I' d.
PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 229.
', GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 128.
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may be either expressed in the constitution or derived from the basic
norm.
35
John Austin, unlike Kelsen, believed that customs could not become
positive law until they were judicially adopted:
The custom is transmuted into positive law, when it is adopted as such by
the courts of justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are
enforced by the power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts,
and clothed with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive morality: a
rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects; but deriving the only
force, which it can be said to possess, from the general disapprobation fall-
ing on those who transgress it.36
Austin's analysis of customary law, it is submitted, is consistent with Kel-
sen's view of law as a coercive order. Kelsen's concept of customary law is
foreign to any theory of positive law. To Kelsen, a norm must include a
sanction to be a legal norm.3 7 The sanction, furthermore, must possess
social organization. 8 Even a legislatively established norm "must be re-
garded as legally irrelevant" if it lacks a sanction.39
In a legal sense, a sanction attaches to a particular norm only when a
legislature enacts a sanction for violating the norm, or a court holds a
defendant liable for violating it. Until a legislature or court so acts, the
norm may be socially binding, but it is not legally binding. Thus, it is
immaterial whether a norm originated in a custom or originated in the
minds of the legislature or court. Without a sanction a norm is not posi-
tive law; with a sanction it is.
Kelsen, however, specifically disagreed with the position of Austin:
"Austin overlooks the fact that the rule created by custom may be a rule
providing sanctions-and must be such a rule in order to be a rule of law
-so that 'custom' is 'clothed with the legal sanction' before it is 'adopted
by the courts.' "40 Kelsen appears to argue that to be a customary law, a
custom must have a customary sanction. If this is true, does a court ever
need to apply customary law? Customary law would seem to stand by
itself outside the judicial system.41 No one nee& sue to have it enforced,
35 PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 226. Kelsen stated that if the authority to apply custom-
ary norms is not expressed in the constitution, it may be derived from customary "unwritten
norms of constitution." GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 126. He recognized, however, that
if "a norm that regulates the creation of general [customary] norms, can be created by cus-
tom, then it must already be presupposed that custom is a law-creating fact. This presuppo-
sition can only be the basic norm .. " PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 226.
j. AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 101-02.
3 See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
's PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 52.
40 GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 127.
One might respond that an injured party might seek to have a court impose a sanction,
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and aspiring lawyers need not study it in law school. In addition, why
should Kelsen insist that customary law be derived from the same basic
norm as non-customary law? Why not presuppose two basic norms? One
norm would state that people ought to behave as the constitution
prescribes; the other that people ought to behave in conformity with so-
cially binding norms."2
Court-Made Law
Kelsen postulated that customary law exists prior to its application
by a court, and recognized that some need remains for courts to apply
customary law. He also acknowledged the distinction between the appli-
cation of a general legal norm created by custom, and one created by
legislation:
[T]he ascertainment of the validity of a norm of customary law to be ap-
plied-that is, the ascertainment that a law-creating custom is present
-plays a much more prominent and clear role in the judge's conscience
than the ascertainment of the validity of a norm created by legislation and
published in the official gazette. This explains why the view is sometimes
held that customary law is court-made law. If the courts have to apply usu-
ally customary law, as in the sphere of the Anglo-American common law,
and if they, besides, have the authority to create precedents, a theory can
easily develop in such an area that all law is court-made law; that no law
exists before the judge's decision; that a norm becomes a legal norm only
because it is applied by the court.13
It is submitted that the role of courts in ascertaining the validity of a
norm of customary law is not only more prominent than their role in as-
certaining the validity of legislation, but is also qualitatively different. In
the case of statutes and judicial precedents, a court need merely open its
law books. In the case of customary law, however, a court must first de-
termine whether a relevant social norm exists and, then, whether it is
considered binding by an overwhelming majority of those obligated or en-
titled by it.44 The additional discretion inherent in ascertaining the valid-
ity of customary-law norms further weakens Kelsen's contention that
courts ascertain, rather than create, customary law. It is true that courts
other than the customary sanction, upon a violator of a customary law. But in such a case,
the existence of the customary sanction would be secondary; it would be the imposition of
the judicial sanction that would bring the norm within the legal order.
" See Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIs. 94, 99 (1974).
13 PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 254-55 (citing J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF THE
LAW (2d ed. 1927)).
" In all instances, including legislation, judicial precedents, and customary law, after ascer-
taining a law's validity, judicial interpretation may be necessary to determine whether its
application is appropriate in the case to be decided.
26 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1981
may create customary law only within strict guidelines, since they must
draw only from socially binding norms. It is courts, however, that must
determine which norms are considered socially binding, and it is courts
which impose sanctions for violations of such norms. It appears prefera-
ble, therefore, to view courts as creating rather than merely applying cus-
tomary law. It does not follow, as Kelsen feared, and legal realists ar-
gued, 45 that courts create law when they apply legislation and judicial
precedents, since there are persuasive grounds for viewing customary law
differently from legislation and judicial precedents.
Although Kelsen believed that Anglo-American common law is pri-
marily customary law,"' this is not necessarily true, at least in modern
times. Judges usually do not create precedent by applying social norms
that are considered binding.4 Precedents are created when they interpret
ambiguous statutory or constitutional provisions, or fill in gaps4 s in the
law, in the manner they find most consistent with moral principles and
public policy as reflected in the existing legal order."' These principles
and policies need not be, and usually are not, social customs. Courts are
authorized to apply such principles and policies:
[A legislator] realizes the possibility that the general norms he enacts may
in some cases lead to unjust or inequitable results, because the legislator
cannot foresee all the concrete cases which possibly may occur. He therefore
authorizes the law-applying organ not to apply the general norms created by
the legislator but to create a new norm in case the application of the general
norms created by the legislator would have an unsatisfactory result.50
Traditional jurisprudence, in Kelsen's view, does not acknowledge
that courts have such discretion. Rather, it postulates that judges may
substitute their judgment for a legislature's only when gaps exist in the
law-that is, when the legal order lacks a general norm applicable to a
particular case. Kelsen noted, however, that a legal order which contains
an applicable legal norm may at times also yield an unsatisfactory result.
As an example, he suggested a legal order that "contains a legal norm
applicable to murder with robbery in the same way as to the case in
which a son kills his incurably ill father upon the latter's request."' Fur-
thermore, Kelsen aruged, it was impossible for there to be gaps in a legal
order because, at the very least, a legal order regulates all behavior by not
"' See text accompanying note 9 supra.
46 PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 254.
4 Binding social norms may be applied occasionally, as when contracts between merchants
are construed.
" See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra.
49 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 4 (1977).
50 GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 148.
5' PURE THEORY, supra note 1, at 246-47.
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prohibiting it. Kelsen, nevertheless, viewed the theory of gaps as a valu-
able fiction: If a judge accepts the assumption that the law has gaps, he
will "only rarely make use of his authorization to take the place of the
legislation. '3
2
Thus, Kelsen accepted a theory that he recognized as fictional and
only partly effective in order to prevent the application of positive law
when it would yield unjust results. This seems unnecessary. A preferable
approach would be to acknowledge the full scope of judicial authority and
to recognize that judges must be trusted to divorce personal values from
their work and to create exceptions to existing law only when such excep-
tions are consistent with the moral principles and public policies inherent
in the legal order.
Although Kelsen acknowledged that courts may have authority to
create exceptions to positive law, as in the case of customary law, he de-
nied thay they create law:
The court always applies preexisting law, but the law it applies may not he
substantive, but adjective law. The court may apply only those general
norms which determine its own existence and procedure, the general norms
which confer upon certain individuals the legal capacity to act as a court of
a certain State.53
This point, however, accomplishes little. It states that courts do not ex-
ceed their authority when they apply principles not found in substantive
law, but it does not face the implications of the fact that courts do apply
principles not found in substantive law. A positivist theory of law that
admits that non-positive law may determine legal rights and duties--even
pursuant to positive procedural law-does little to bolster the positivist
dichotomy .between law and morals.5 4
A CRITIQUE OF THE BASIC NORM
What distinguishes a legal order from the demands of a group of
gunmen? Is there a difference? The source of authority to make law has
been called "the central question of political philosophy." 55 Kelsen an-
swered that the authority to make law derives from a presupposed basic
norm. It has been suggested that "[b]y blandly suggesting that this basic
norm must be 'presupposed to be binding' Kelsen avoids the most impor-
tant problem in legal philosophy. '6
In examining this charge, a comparison of Austin's and Kelsen's con-
32 Id. at 249.
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 152.
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 49, ch. 2.
I. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE 129 (1978).
A.L. GoODHART, supra note 26, at 18 (1953).
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cepts of the state is helpful. Austin used the term "state" synonymously
with "sovereign."' 7 A sovereign was a group or an individual to whom
"[tihe bulk of the given society are in a habit of obedience" and who
itself "is not in a habit of obedience to a determinate human superior."'58
The sovereign was thus outside the legal system, and could have no au-
thority within that system to make laws. He was the gunman writ large.
Even in Austin's framework, however, the sovereign was not always above
the law; he derived his powers from the law and was subject to it. If the
authority to create law is found in the law, "[t]he theory of sovereignty
seems . . . to involve a begging of the question which positivism sets out
to answer."5' 9
By presupposing the basic norm to provide unity to the legal order,
Kelsen eliminated from his theory of law the concepts of sovereignty and
state as existing apart from the law:
Law and state are usually held to be two distinct entities. But if it be
recognized that the state is by its very nature an ordering of human behav-
ior, that the essential characteristic of this order, coercion, is at the same
time the essential element of the law, this traditional dualism can no longer
be maintained. By subsuming the concept of the state under the concept of
a coercive order which can only be the legal order, by giving up a concept of
the state distinct in principle from the concept of law, the pure theory of
law realizes a tendency inherent in the doctrine of Austin.60
The concept of the basic norm avoids the question of what differenti-
ates law from other coercive orders. Its essential failing is that it identi-
fies the legal order in circular manner. The identity of a legal order is
derived from its basic norm, yet "the content of a basic norm is deter-
mined by the facts through which an order is created and applied, to
which the behaior of the individuals regulated by this order, by and
large, conforms."" Is this tantamount to a statement the legal order is
whatever it is generally taken to be? If so, what purpose is served by
presupposing a basic norm? H.L.A. Hart suggested:
If a constitution specifying the various sources of law is a living reality in
the sense that the courts and officials of the system actually identify the law
in accordance with the criteria it provides, then the constitution is accepted
and actually exists. It seems a needless reduplication to suggest that there is
57 J. AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 101.
" Id. at 220.
59 L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 69 (1940). One might suggest that Austin an-
swers the question of where individuals get their authority to make law "by denying, in
effect, that there is any such thing as the authority to make law," since Austin placed the
sovereign outside the law. I. BENDIrT, supra note 55.
60 Kelsen, supra note 3, at 64-65.
01 GENERAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 120; see Raz, supra note 42.
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a further rule to the effect that the constitution (or those who 'laid it down')
are to be obeyed.62
CONCLUSION
This article has set forth a summary of Kelsen's pure theory of law, a
critique of his analysis of customary and court-made law, and a discussion
of the basic norm-the doctrine of his legal philosophy which "succeeded
most in attracting attention and capturing the imagination."6 It is hoped
that this article will encourage further interest in Kelsen's work, includ-
ing its broader philosophical underpinnings and its application to inter-
national law, which represents a significant development in jurisprudence.
6' H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 246 (1961).
63 Raz, supra note 42, at 94.
